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The present paper aims at mapping and analyzing the determinants of industrial activity in 
Greek regions in order to assess current investment patterns. For this purpose, we estimate a 
conditional logit model of 226 new established firms for 1996 and 1997. Results give 
interesting insights that are likely of particular importance to regional policy makers. 
Noteworthy is the spatial concentration of firms in different prefectures whilst the large 
metropolitan cities, Athens and Thessalonica, although with declining shares, prevail as the 
dominant hosts. European regional policy seems to enhance firms’ entry via its effect on 
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 1. Introduction and Related Literature 
Mapping investment patterns is of crucial importance to local, national and European policy 
makers whose one of primary aims is to help the development of lagging behind regions.  
Public authorities, having full information on economic conditions and, thus, the needs of 
regions, design and provide particular incentives in order to influence investors’ location 
decisions. Well documented is the spatial clustering of firms, generating in this way 
externalities that spill over to the wider economic area, giving a boost to its development 
(Krugman, 1991, Krugman and Venables, 1995, Venables, 1996, Markusen and Venables, 
1998, Fujita et al., 2001). The ultimate goal then narrows down to creating the initial 
conditions, which will attract a sufficient number of investments at the first place constituting, 
in turn, the centripetal forces for subsequent entrants. 
Greece represents a particular case, being the most peripheral country in Europe and besieged 
by internal problems for many years. On the other hand, political instability due to contingency 
with countries that have faced serious conflicts in the past -with the subsequent negative 
effects- and geographical isolation from the rest of the developed world -and particularly with 
the core of EU-, impact negatively on investment decisions in the hinterland.  
Nevertheless, significant steps have been taken lately by local authorities in providing 
investment motives parallel to the enhancement of the Community Structural Funds (CSF) and 
Cohesion Funds (CF). The assistance to Greece increased from a 2.65% of GDP in 1989-1993 
to 3.67% in 1994-1999, the largest part of which directed to the improvement of infrastructure 
whilst a smaller part financed training (Paliginis, 2001). However, a necessary condition for 
designing any regional policy would be an analytical mapping of economic activity internally, 
revealing the relative strengths and weaknesses of different regions.  
The present paper is unique in its twofold scope: it maps economic activity and at the same 
time analyzes the location choices of investors in Greece. Our extensive database allows us to 




 level. Relevant studies are scarce in the field due to data limitation, whilst the 
limited ones that have been carried out deal either with multinational activity in Greece focused 
on a national level (Papanastassiou  et al., 2000) or relate to the decade of eighties
2
. In 
particular, Louri (1988) assesses the relative effects of regional policy on investment in Greek 
manufacturing industry during 1971-1982, the results of which stress the positive role of 
investment incentives and infrastructure expenditures. An attempt to evaluate the effect of 
sectoral policy in manufacturing entry (1982-1988) was then made (Anagnostaki and Louri, 
1995), focusing on features of already built-up firms as explanatory variables. Finally, closer in 
perception to the present paper are Louri and Anagnostaki (1995) who examine entry decisions 
in Greek manufacture in the 1984-1987 period, providing useful hints on differences between 
Athens vs. the rest of Greece (i.e., depicting a broad core-periphery investment pattern in 
Greece – which according to our study, holds until the late nineties).        
Most of the relevant empirical literature analyzes the determinants of industrial activity, with a 
particular emphasis on firms’ clustering, at a national level (Wheeler and Mody, 1992, 
Devereux and Griffith, 1998) or within US states (Carlton, 1983, Friedman et al., 1992). Head 
et al. (1995) examine Japanese manufacturing investments in the US and provide at the same 
time a map of their geographical distribution among the states. Nevertheless, there are a few 
exemptions that deal with thinner geographical analyses within countries. Hansen (1987) 
examines the economic determinants of interurban location behavior of 360 branch and transfer 
plants in Sao Paolo, Brazil, providing evidence of the role played by both factor inputs and 
agglomeration economies. In an analogous study, Henderson and Kuncoro (1996) explore 
manufacturing activity in Java, Indonesia. Their results suggest that firm location decisions 
respond to typical market variables as well as to the existence of local historical industrial 
environment in order to benefit from the built-up stock of local information in regards to 
institutions, linkages and technology. China was examined in Head and Ries (1996) who 
investigated investment decisions for 54 cities and a similar work belongs to Cheng and Kwan 
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(2000) who estimated 29 Chinese regions confirming the self-reinforcing effect on foreign 
direct investment (FDI) on itself.  
Very close analyses to the present paper, though regarding foreign investments, were carried 
out by Guimaraes et al. (2000) and by Crozet et al. (2002). The former paper presents a spatial 
distribution of FDI start-ups in Portuguese concelhos. The latter maps location choices by 
foreign investors in France focusing especially on agglomeration effects and on the impact of 
French and European regional policies. Whilst the agglomeration hypothesis is strongly 
supported, investment incentives do no seem to have raised the attractiveness of French 
regions.   
The present study illustrates total manufacturing establishments in the Greek territory, both 
domestic and foreign. It then tries to answer vital questions for policy makers: Which are those 
regional characteristics that attract investors? Do firms agglomerate in particular regions and 
why? Do all industries depict the same pattern of geographic concentration? What are the 
reasons underlying their clustering in particular regions? Have both Greek and European 
regional policies played any role on location choice? 
The following section presents the methodology followed and discusses the underlying 
hypotheses. Section 3 illustrates and comments on the estimated results and, finally, section 4 
summarizes the main findings and concludes.   
 
 2. Econometric Setup and Underlying Hypotheses 
In this paper we adopt the econometric methodology developed by Crozet et al., (2002), Head 
et al., (1999) and Friedman et al., (1992).  Thus, the present model assumes that investors 
maximize an intertemporal profit function subject to uncertainty in regards to location selection 
once they have already decided to build a manufacturing plant in Greece. The nature of 
location choice is a discrete one among several alternatives.  Models with a qualitative 
endogenous variable are often used in the empirical literature.  Based on the above, the model 
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assumes that once an investor decides to open a manufacturing plant in Greece, she maximizes 
a profit function subject to uncertainty of its location.  On the other hand, the random 
component comes from maximization errors, other unobserved characteristics of choices or 
measurement errors in the exogenous variables.  We can then write the profit function of an 
investor i, locating in region j as: 
 ij ij ijU     (3.1) 
where 1 2(ln ,ln ,..., ln )ij i i ikU X X X with Xim represents the set of m observable characteristics 
of location i, and εij is a random variable.  The investor i will choose to locate in region j rather 
that location k if the following expression holds: 
 , ,ij ik k k j     (3.2) 
Since the profit function has a stochastic part, the probability that location j is selected by 
investor i can be defined as: 
 Pr ( ), ,ij ij ikP ob k k j      (3.3) 
Under the assumption that the error terms are distributed independently and according to a 
















This is the conditional logit model or McFadden’s choice model.  Using equation (3.4) and 
assuming that Uij is a linear combination of the explanatory variables, we can estimate the 
coefficient of each variable using maximum likelihood.  To further test the validity of our 
results, we performed a test for controlling the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) 
property.  This property states that the ratio of probabilities of choosing two locations is 
independent of the characteristics of any third location, in other words the choices must be 
equally substitutable to the investors. 
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From the analysis mentioned above, it is evident that we model the probability that a given 
region receives a plant location at period t as a function of a set of explanatory variables.  
These are characteristics of the specific region and can be broadly classified in five large 
groups: Demand conditions on the chosen location, production factors’ costs, agglomeration 
factors such as the number of active firms in that same location, public policies designed to 
attract firms or improve local infrastructure and finally the already built-up infrastructure of the 
location choice. 
Those determinants can be incorporated in a simple framework yielding an estimable equation 
that can describe the profitability of choosing a specific location, assuming a Cournot type 
competition of firms that use quantity as their strategic variable.  The description of variables 
and the respective sources are provided in Table 1 of Appendix 1. 
We now proceed to a more analytical description of the factors that enter firms’ profit function. 
A well-founded hypothesis in the relevant literature is the market potential as captured by the 
respective region’s market size (RMS). Although more relevant within national boundaries, 
regional income has an important role to play especially if goods produced are costly to 
transport. It provides a good measure of the respective local demand. Local GDP is used here 
in order to capture the effect of regional market on location choices. 
Taking advantage of endowment availability is a major concern of investors and an established 
corollary in traditional localization theories. Firms require a set of primary inputs in order to 
operate, with labor being the most important one. Wage considerations would, thus, impulse on 
investors’ choices within the framework of profit maximization. We segment labor into 
unskilled and skilled force and use the average wage bill of blue-collar (LC) and white-collar 
workers respectively (HK). The average cost of skilled labor (white collar) is used as a proxy 
for the availability of human capital, in line with new growth theories (Lucas, 1988, Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin, 1995) and the need for upgraded and elaborated inputs in production
3
 emerging 
from increased competition induced by globalization forces.  
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Related to these are expenditures on Research and Development (R&D) by already located 
firms. R&D expenses provide an indication both of the existence of a technological base and 
the potential for positive externalities arising from the interaction through upstream and 
downstream networks (Krugman, 1991, Venables, 1996). Manufacturing R&D expenditures 
over the total number of located firms is employed as a measure of the current knowledge 
creation of regions (KC) and is expected to exhibit a positive sign unless a centripetal force 
would enact due to fear of competition
4
.                                
Local infrastructure
5
 to facilitate production and transportation both of input and output goods 
is undoubtedly a prerequisite for establishing a production plant. Road availability and 
highways are the most common used indicators for proxying infrastructure. However, due to 
data limitation, we implore the number of private cars per capita as the most relevant measure 
for our purposes. It is expected to affect positively location choices and a positive effect is 
expected (LI). 
Existence of regional clusters (RC) is captured by the cumulated counts of firms belonging to 
the same sector, following Head et al. (1995, 1999), and Crozet et al. (2002)
6
. A positive 
significant sign would indicate the existence of agglomeration forces and would, thus, confirm 
new economic geography theories.  
Assistance from the EU (CSF) and motives provided by the Greek government through the 
Development Law (DL) are then examined to assess their effect on production location. The 
amount of CSF received by each region is the one measure used, whilst funds (a particular 
percentage of start-up costs) available to investors for regions eligible to be included in the 
Development Law capture the influence of Greek regional policy
7
.  
The factors that influence a firm’s decision over its location regard those that vary across 
regions. Hence, firm characteristics, which are stable across regions, drop out of the location 
decision (Deveraux et al., 2003). Nevertheless, and in order to control for differential firm 
behavior, we interacted the region with two firm features. A commonly tested factor entails the 
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size of the firm making the decision. Firm size is perceived to represent firm-specific 
advantages such as easier exploitation of scale economies (Veugelers, 1996), better access to 
credit or more efficient production of goods (Kinoshita, 1998). The second measure relates to 
firm’s profitability as a sign of its economic ‘health’; this could potentially make a difference 
in selecting a particular region as again, this captures firm-specific advantages. We measure 
firm size by the number of employees
8
, while for the profitability we use the gross profits over 
turnover
9
.   
Of particular interest would also be to check for the ownership of new manufacturing plants, 
i.e., whether these are of Greek or foreign origin. The majority of the sample consists of Greek 
firms and it is noteworthy that only 12 of the 226 total are foreign. So, the most plausible way 
to check for a differential location strategy is to drop out those 12 non-Greek firms and test 
solely for the domestic ones.  
Next, a significant question that arises asks whether the same locational pattern affects 
similarly all sectors. Unfortunately, the limited number of observations for each sector does not 
allow for separate tests, however exploring heterogeneous strategic location decisions is 
feasible between traditional and modern sectors
10
.  
Finally, given the concentration of firms in the large metropolitan areas of Athens and 
Thessaloniki, we proceed by investigating investment location patterns excluding in a first step 
Athens, then Thessaloniki and lastly both of them, in order to eliminate any biases caused by 
these large centres.   
 
 3. Data Sample Description 
Our study uses a sample of manufacturing firms operating in Greece.  Individual firm 
information is part of the ICAP directory, which is published annually and provides data based 
on published accounts of all Plc. and Ltd. firms in Greece.  The firms included have at least 10 
employees and are considered to be medium and large-sized
11
.  These firms account though for 
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almost 85% of the total manufacturing value added in 1997.  We proceed in two ways:  At a 




Insert Figure 1 here. 
 
It is obvious that the majority of firms in our sample are located near the two large 
metropolitan centers i.e. Athens (GR30)
13
 and Thessaloniki (GR12).  Over 70% of the firms 
participating in our database are located in these two regions.  The lowest share is allocated to 
the islands i.e. Ionia Nisia (GR22) and Notio Aigaio (GR41).  Regarding the absolute number 
of new establishments, the two large metropolitan regions concentrate above 50% of new 
firms.  Ionia Nisia (GR22) and Notio Aigaio (GR41) still attract only a small part of new 
investments.  Interesting is also the case of Peloponnisos (GR25) which attracts a small 
fraction of new investments, although the number of already established firms is quite large. 
 
Insert Figure 2 here. 
Our next step is to test whether some regions are more dynamic, in attracting new investments, 
than others.  To accomplish this, we mapped the new investments relative to the total number 
of firms already in the region.  The underlying assumption is that the larger this fraction is, the 
more dynamic is the region in attracting new investors. 
 
Insert Figure 3 here. 
 
The picture one gets is quite different than the previous two.  Peripheral regions show more 
dynamism than the metropolitan areas.  The creation of competitive advantages through 
specific regional policies and EU funding, seems to attract new investors.  Dytiki Macedonia 
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(GR13) and Notio Aigaio (GR41) lead the race, followed by Anatoliki Macedonia, Thrace 
(GR11) and Ionia Nisia (GR22).  
Another dynamic element one may wish to exploit regards the ratios of new establishments 
belonging to the modern and traditional sectors respectively over the total number of new 
plants. This will enrich the picture we have up to now as to the competitiveness of Greek 
regions to distinctive industrial groups. 
Insert Figure 4 here 
Insert Figure 5 here 
 
 
Indeed, the illustration manifests a variation in the dynamism of traditional versus modern 
sectors. In what regards the first, the majority of new establishments are gathered in Kriti (GR 
43) followed by Ipeiros (GR 21) in Kentriki Ellada. On the contrary, Kriti and Ipeiros are the 
least preferred regions of modern new establishments, which are concentrated in Voreio 
Aigaio, Dytiki Ellada and Dytiki Makedonia. Obviously, the Greek Development Law and the 
EU regional funds favor the modern sectors the most, whereas it appears that entrepreneurs 
who set up a firm in Kriti and Ipeiros exploit the regions’ comparative advantage in terms of 
raw materials for the Food and Beverages sector.  
Bearing in mind these facts we tested for the locational determinants that attract new 
investments.  We used data on new establishments during 1996 and 1997 for which we were 
able to find consistent regional data on Greek regions.  Our sample consists of 226 newly 
established firms, 161 of which were established in 1996 and 65 in 1997. 
 Testing for locational choices is not an easy task due to regional data limitations.  We obtained 
data for the NUTS 2 Greek regions mainly from two sources, the National Greek Statistical 
Agency and the Regiostat database of Eurostat.  The description of NUTS 2 regions and other 
information may be found in Appendix 1. 
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 4. Overview of the Results 
In order to check for robustness of results and evaluate more accurately the relative importance 
of each hypothesis, we deploy alternative specifications. The basic model on which we build is 
depicted in column (1) of Table 1. 
 
Insert Table 1 here.  
 
We first test for standard variables related to market conditions by estimating location choice 
on market size, labor costs, human capital, technological sophistication and infrastructure 
(column 1). Results provide strong support to the hypotheses posed above, with the market size 
(RMS) and infrastructure development (LI) exerting the most powerful force.  
Next we attempt to assess the role of agglomeration economies by including the number of pre-
existing firms in the same sector (RC, column 2). It is clearly evident that investors are mostly 
interested in dynamic externalities arising from the interaction among firms of the same sector, 
with the relevant coefficient being significant at the 1% level. This finding contradicts the one 
obtained by Anagnostaki and Louri (1995) who used the share of four largest firms of the 
sector in terms of employment as a degree of concentration for 1982-1988. Nonetheless, the 
two results are not necessarily contradictory per se; they rather depict a reorientation in firms’ 
decisions between the decade of eighties and the decade of nineties.  
 Turning now to regional policies, funds available to investors by the Greek Development Law 
and the EU are included in the model (DL and CSF, columns 3 and 4
14
). Though it should be 
expected that they exert influence on investors’ location choices, results indicate a negative and 
significant effect in the third specification and a negative non-significant one in the fourth
15
. 
An interpretation for this contradictory outcome lies on the nature of these funds. On the one 
hand, the Law predicts that a fixed amount of funds would be available to eligible investors in 
order to cover a specific percentage of the fixed cost of a new branch. Important as this may be 
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to start-up a business, it still constitutes a small fraction of total investment cost. Thus, 
investors appear to be more concerned with local conditions, which weigh more heavily in the 
profit function of firms (which may explain the negative non-significant sign). On the other 
hand, funds may also be perceived as a deterrent for investments aiming at compensating for 
the lack of necessary local conditions, such as demand, infrastructure etc (thus, the negative 
significant sign).  
CSF constitute a rather different type of assistance than funds available by the Development 
Law. Greek regions are eligible under objective 1, which regards infrastructure development, 
economic competitiveness, human resources and employment, improvement in reduction of 
regional disparities, and technical assistance. Column 4 is illustrative of the effect caused in 
results by the inclusion of European assistance. It is evident that this variable dominates the 
rest of the variables, except for the agglomeration effect, which continues to indicate a highly 
statistical significance. This does not weaken our previous results. Instead, CSF may be 
conceived as the umbrella under which existence and development of local influences depends 
on. Hence, EU’s assistance ensures availability of necessary pre-conditions for a potential 
investor on top of ensuring stability and further development. 
Finally, a last specification assesses the impact of established firms irrespective of the sector 
they belong (TF, column 5). Existence of prior investments in general could be a signal for 
potential future investors of at least a minimum level of an influx of factors necessary to start 
up and operate a business efficiently.   It appears that this is not what investors would rely on 
to make their decisions; they would rather be concerned with the existence of particular 
elements according to their specific production interest. Reinforcing to this argument stands the 
robustness of regression, with all other variables maintaining their sign and significance.   





In order to check whether the concentration of firms in the large metropolitan cities of Athens 
and Thessaloniki distort our overall picture of location decisions in Greek regions, we estimate 
three different sub-samples, comparing them with the full model. 
Insert Table 2 here 
The first sub-sample excludes Athens leaving us with 129 new establishments in the rest of 
Greece. Results are indeed the same as the full sample with the only difference that in this case 
local infrastructure seems to matter more. The 182 number of observations continue to 
maintain their signs and significance when dropping out Thessaloniki, with RMS as the only 
exception as it looses its significance. In the last specification (last column, excluding Athens 
plus Thessaloniki), we are left only with 85 observations and, not surprisingly, with HK, LI 
and KC affecting to a lesser extent the location choice (5%, 10% and 10% respectively). 
Next, estimating only the domestic new establishments and contrasting it with the whole 
sample, we explore the potential differentiated firm strategic behavior
17
.  
Insert Table 3 here 
Notwithstanding the fact the foreign new establishments amount only to 12 observations, the 
pattern is somewhat dissimilar. Knowledge creation (KC), regional clusters (RC) and the 
regional market size (RMS) give exactly the same results. What is noteworthy though, refers to 
the two variables capturing human capital (HK) and labor cost (LC) which do not emerge 
significant for domestic entrepreneurs. This manifests the high interest of foreign 
(multinational) firms to the labor force they employ, especially when it comes to the qualitative 
aspects of it. 
Finally, Table 5 distinguishes between traditional and modern sectors’ regional choices. 
Insert Table 4 here 
 A main observation is the numerical dominance of traditional sectors (132 new 
establishments) relative to the modern ones (amounting to 94). The traditional sample performs 
pretty well whilst the modern sub-sample fails to achieve significance for its explanatory 
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variables except for the RMS which emerges as strongly and positively significant. These 
results are illustrative of diverse strategic needs of entrepreneurs between the two with the 
latter obviously entailing more complex needs and requirements.  
Although as already mentioned in the beginning, firm characteristics normally are not 
encountered in location decisions since they don’t vary across regions, we interacted the firm 
specific attributes with the identification number of regions so as to be able capture their effect. 
Results are slightly modified with respect to CSF, which do not exert a significant sign. 
However, the rest of the variables remain robust
18
.  
Insert Table 5 here 
Both incorporated internal to the firm factors, i.e. size and profitability turn out to be 
significant for the selection of location site. What might seem odd though in the first place is 
the negative sign of our size variable, however on second thought, it is sensible to believe that 
the larger the firm, the smaller the probability to set up a plant in any given Greek region. 
Usually, larger firms are more flexible and at a given point in time, they decide to become 
international, entering new foreign markets rather than stay in the limited Greek territory. On 
the other hand, firm’s profitability is positively significant for the location selection, showing 
that the more profitable the enterprise, the more likely it is to choose a particular region in the 
sense that it may not be dramatically affected by the lack of necessary facilities
19
.  
Overall, the investment profile across the Greek regions is in accordance with motivations 
previously discussed in related literature, placing particular emphasis on agglomeration 
economies and human capital availability. As evidenced by the baseline full model (Table 1), 
European funds do seem to have exerted a significant impact on investors’ decision for their 
production location, whilst the Greek Development Law not only hasn’t been enhancing, but it 
has acted in the opposite direction, reducing the probability for a new establishment in any 
given region. Firm-specific attributes are also of particular significance when added to the 
models, witnessing the effect of internal, to the firms, characteristics for any given decision of 
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theirs. Slightly differentiated patterns are finally detected between domestic and foreign owned 
firms as well as between traditional versus modern sector behavior.      
 
   5. Concluding Remarks 
This article mapped economic activities in Greece and presented an empirical formulation of 
investors’ decision-making.  A McFadden’s conditional logit model was incorporated to test 
for the model’s predictions, based on location decisions of 226 new manufacturing plants in the 
prefectures of Greece for the years 1996 and 1997. Estimation results suggest that firms’ 
choices can be modeled in terms of economic factors prevailing locally. The consensus in 
regards to the nowadays empirically and theoretically established notion of spatial clusters is 
confirmed for the case of Greece, with firms of the same sector locating close to each other in 
order to benefit from positive externalities. Typical market variables such as market size and 
labor costs as well as advanced infrastructure, human capital and knowledge creation constitute 
an influx of necessary conditions that induces undertaking production in a particular place.  
On the other hand, the picture of the influence exerted by public incentives is mixed. Greek co-
financing of a new plant is of no interest to potential investors at the first place, whilst 
European assistance plays its role through its effect on the wider environment. This is of 
particular interest to national and European authorities concerned with regional integration, as 
the provision of aid is not a reinforcing power by itself, unless it boosts development.       
Future research may explore more thoroughly regional location determinants for an expanded 
time span or for the new establishments in recent years in order to be able to compare the 
evolution of location preferences through the time. Another interesting extension would be to 
investigate regional attractiveness focusing on specific sectors besides the wide classification 
of traditional versus modern sectors. This would allow us for more concrete implications 
especially in regards to European and national policies. 
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Figure 1. Distribution of Industrial Activity in Greece (1997), Number of Established Firms  
 
Figure 2. Number of New Establishments (1996-1997) 
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Figure 3. Agglomeration Economies. New Establishments over already established Firms. 
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Figure 5. Percentage of new Modern firms over total new Firms. 
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Table 1. Results of location choice determinants.  Dependent Variable: Choice of Region i. 
 
Variable Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 
RMS 1.714*** 1.109** -1.467 -2.118* 1.657** 
 (0.405) (0.459) (1.275) (1.250) (0.701) 
HK 8.938** 8.271* 19.288*** 8.068 9.871** 
 (4.303) (4.288) (6.855) (7.628) (4.642) 
LC -4.245** -4.370** -9.481*** -1.405 -4.067** 
 (1.990) (1.989) (3.058) (3.752) (1.969) 
LI 2.152*** 1.374 4.207** 1.886 2.459* 
 (0.817) (0.864) (1.635) (1.739) (1.350) 
KC 27.919* 31.023** 62.915*** 26.753 28.294* 
 (15.040) (14.999) (21.861) (22.643) (15.350) 
RC  0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
DL   -0.040** -0.027  
   (0.018) (0.018)  
CSF    2.441***  
    (0.760)  
TF     -0.001 
     (0.001) 
      
N 226 226 226 226 226 
Pseudo R 0.262 0.270 0.275 0.284 0.271 
LR chi2 304.19 312.81 318.49 328.91 313.95 
Standard Errors are in parentheses 
*** p < 0.01   **  p < 0.05    * p < 0.10 
 
Table 2. Results of location choice determinants 
Dependent Variable: Choice of Region i. 
 
Variable Total Sample Without Athens Without Thessaloniki 
Without Athens and 
Thessaloniki 
RMS 1.109** 0.965* 0.458 0.266 
 (0.459) (0.533) (0.555) (1.005) 
HK 8.271* 13.240*** 13.757*** 12.093** 
 (4.288) (4.930) (5.153) (5.464) 
LC -4.370** -3.606** -3.649** -2.953 
 (1.989) (1.843) (1.790) (2.070) 
LI 1.374 2.984** 2.906*** 2.376* 
 (0.864) (1.255) (1.088) (1.317) 
KC 31.023** 30.412** 40.481** 29.661* 
 (14.999) (15.029) (16.126) (18.073) 
RC 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.006** 0.019 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.013) 
     
N 226 129 182 85 
Pseudo R 0.270 0.163 0.312 0.077 
LR chi2 312.81 104.46 282.28 31.32 
Standard Errors are in parentheses 
*** p < 0.01   **  p < 0.05    * p < 0.10 
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Table 3. Results of location choice determinants for domestic establishments 
Dependent Variable: Choice of Region i. 
 
Variable Total Sample Only Domestic 
RMS 1.109** 1.177*** 
 (0.459) (0.475) 
HK 8.271* 5.907 
 (4.288) (4.451) 
LC -4.370** -3.053 
 (1.989) (2.034) 
LI 1.374 0.970 
 (0.864) (0.894) 
KC 31.023** 31.748** 
 (14.999) (15.999) 
RC 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
   
N 226 214 
Pseudo R 0.270 0.267 
LR chi2 312.81 293.45 
Standard Errors are in parentheses 
*** p < 0.01   **  p < 0.05    * p < 0.10 
 
 
Table 4. Results of location choice determinants – Traditional vs. Modern sectors 
Dependent Variable: Choice of Region i. 
 
Variable Traditional Modern 
RMS 0.618 2.286*** 
 (0.617) (0.751) 
HK 9.082* 8.473 
 (5.443) (7.420) 
LC -6.884*** -0.446 
 (2.724) (2.961) 
LI 1.984** 1.561 
 (1.085) (1.596) 
KC 57.195** 1.097 
 (24.266) (20.501) 
RC 0.007*** -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.005) 
   
N 132 94 
Pseudo R 0.317 0.211 
LR chi2 235.61 87.74 
Standard Errors are in parentheses 






Table 5. Results of location choice determinants with firm-level characteristics incorporated 
Dependent Variable: Choice of region i. 
 
Variable Column 1΄ Column 2΄ Column 3΄ Column 4΄ Column 5΄ 
RMS 2.282*** 1.663*** 0.916 -1.000 -0.384 
 (0.465) (0.495) (1.446) (3.317) (0.884) 
HK 10.742** 9.570** 12.455* 1.215) 2.640 
 (4.753) (4.748) (7.182) (19.051) (5.184) 
LC -0.941 -0.777 -2.346 3.429 0.753 
 (1.800) (1.793) (3.382) (9.722) (1.864) 
LI 1.954** 0.717 1.515 -0.835 -6.017** 
 (0.926) (0.994) (1.775) (4.107) (2.784) 
KC 9.485 12.148 21.325 17.640 17.356 
 (15.780) (15.625) (23.008) (23.260) (15.203) 
RC  0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
DL   -0.011 -0.017  
   (0.020) (0.022)  
CSF    0.045  
    (0.071)  
TF     0.003*** 
     (0.001) 
SIZE -2.520** -3.034*** -2.851** -2.084 -7.133*** 
 (1.113) (1.115) (1.155) (1.636) (2.010) 
PROF 0.104* 0.131** 0.123** 0.124** 0.335*** 
 (0.060) (0.060) (0.061) (0.061) (0.103) 
      
N 226 226 226 226 226 
Pseudo R 0.283 0.295 0.296 0.296 0.302 
LR chi2 307.17 319.78 320.08 320.49 326.75 
Standard Errors are in parentheses 
*** p < 0.01   **  p < 0.05    * p < 0.10 
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Appendix 1 
Table 1. Variable Description and Source of data. 
 
Variable Name Variable Description Source 
RMS Market Potential of the region, local GDP. Eurostat Regional Statistics 
HK Human Capital, monthly wage bill of white 
collar employees. 
Greek National Statistics Service 
LC Labor Cost, hourly wage of workers. Greek National Statistics Service 
LI Local Infrastructure, private cars per capita. Eurostat Regional Statistics 
KC Knowledge creation, Manufacturing R&D 
expenditures per firm. 
Eurostat Regional Statistics, ICAP 
Directory and author’s calculations 
RC Regional Clusters, cumulated number of 
firms belonging to the same sector. 
ICAP Directory and author’s 
calculations 
DL Development Law, grants to new investors. Ministry of Economy and Finance 
CSF Community Structural Funds, Objective 1. Annual Report of European 
Commission  
TF Total Firms, cumulated number of firms 
irrespectively of sector. 
ICAP Directory and author’s 
calculations 
SIZE Total number of employees per firm. ICAP Directory 
PROF Gross Profits over Turnover ICAP Directory and author’s 
calculations 
 
Table 2. Greek NUTS 2 Regions 
Region Code Broad Region Sub Regions 
GR Ellada 
GR1 Voreia Ellada 
GR11  Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki 
GR12 Kentriki Makedonia 
GR13 Dytiki Makedonia 
GR14 Thessalia 
GR2 Kentriki Ellada 
GR21  Ipeiros 
GR22 Ionia Nisia 
GR23 Dytiki Ellada 
GR24 Sterea Ellada 
GR25 Peloponnisos 
GR3 Attiki 
GR4 Nisia Aigaiou, Kriti 
GR41  Voreio Aigaio 
GR42 Notio Aigaio 
GR43 Kriti 




Table 3. Greek NUTS 2 Regions and Prefectures 
Prefecture NUTS Population Area (km.²) Area (mi.²) Capital 
Achaea GR232 297,318 3,209 1,239 Patras (Patrai) 
Aitolia and Akarnania GR231 230,688 5,447 2,103 Missolongi (Mesolongion) 
Arcadia GR252 103,840 4,419 1,706 Tripolis (Tripolitza) 
Argolis GR251 97,250 2,214 855 Nauplion 
Arta GR211 78,884 1,612 622 Arta 
Attica GR3 3,522,769 3,808 1,470 Athens (Athenai) 
Boeotia GR241 134,034 3,211 1,240 Levadeia 
Corfu GR222 105,043 641 247 Corfu (Kerkyra) 
Corinth GR253 142,365 2,290 884 Corinth (Korinthos) 
Cyclades GR422 95,083 2,572 993 Hermoupolis (Ermoupole) 
Dodecanese GR421 162,439 2,705 1,044 Rhodes (Rodos) 
Drama GR114 96,978 3,468 1,339 Drama 
Euboea GR242 209,132 3,908 1,509 Khalkis (Chalkida) 
Evritania GR243 23,535 2,045 790 Karpenissi (Karpenesion) 
Evros GR111 143,791 4,242 1,638 Alexandroupolis 
Florina GR134 52,854 1,863 719 Florina 
Fokis GR245 43,889 2,121 819 Amfissa 
Fthiotis GR244 168,291 4,368 1,686 Lamia 
Grevena GR131 37,017 2,338 903 Grevena 
Heraklion GR431 263,868 2,641 1,020 Heraklion (Candia, Megalokastron) 
Ilia GR233 174,021 2,681 1,035 Pyrgos 
Imathia GR121 138,068 1,712 661 Veroia 
Ioannina GR213 157,214 4,990 1,927 Ioannina (Yannina) 
Karditsa GR141 126,498 2,576 995 Karditsa 
Kastoria GR132 52,721 1,685 651 Kastoria 
Kavala GR115 135,747 2,109 814 Kavala (Cavalla) 
Kefallinia GR223 32,314 935 361 Argostoli (Argostolion) 
Khalkidiki GR127 91,654 2,945 1,137 Polygyros 
Khania GR434 133,060 2,376 917 Khania (Canea) 
Khios GR413 52,691 904 349 Khios 
Kilkis GR123 81,845 2,614 1,009 Kilkis 
Kozani GR133 150,159 3,562 1,375 Kozani 
Laconia GR254 94,916 3,636 1,404 Sparta (Sparte) 
Larisa GR142 269,300 5,351 2,066 Larisa (Larissa) 
Lasithi GR432 70,762 1,823 704 Agios Nikolaos 
Lesvos GR411 103,700 2,154 832 Mytilene 
Levkas GR224 20,900 325 125 Levkas (Leucadia) 
Magnesia GR143 197,613 2,636 1,018 Volos (Nea Ionia) 
Messinia GR255 167,292 2,991 1,155 Kalamata (Kalamai) 
Mount Athos GR127 1,472 336 130 Karyai (Karyes) 
Pella GR124 138,261 2,506 968 Edessa 
Pieria GR125 116,820 1,506 581 Katerini 
Preveza GR214 58,910 1,086 419 Preveza 
Rethymnon GR433 69,290 1,496 578 Rethymnon (Rethymni) 
Rodopi GR113 103,295 2,543 982 Komotini 
Samos GR412 41,850 778 300 Samos (Limin Vatheos, Vathy) 
Serrai GR126 191,890 3,970 1,533 Serrai (Serres) 
Thesprotia GR212 44,202 1,515 585 Hegoumenitsa 
Thessaloniki GR122 977,528 3,560 1,375 Thessaloniki (Salonica) 
Trikala GR144 137,819 3,367 1,300 Trikala (Trikkala) 
Xanthi GR112 90,450 1,793 692 Xanthi 
Zakynthos GR221 32,746 406 157 Zakynthos (Zante) 
Source: Eurostat Regional Statistics 
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Table 4. Greek Manufacturing Sectors 
Sector Number Sector Description Modern or Traditional 
20 Food and Agricultural Products Traditional 
21 Beverages Traditional 
22 Tobacco and Tobacco Products Traditional 
23 Textile Products Traditional 
24 Fabric and Leather Products Traditional 
25 Wood and Cork Traditional 
26 Furniture Traditional 
27 Paper and Products Traditional 
28 Newspapers, Magazines and Publishing Traditional 
29 Leather and Fur Traditional 
30 Rubber and Plastics Modern 
31 Chemicals, Gases, Medicines and Cosmetics Modern 
32 Petroleum and Coal Products, Gas Bottling Modern 
33 Non-Metallic Mineral Products Modern 
34 Primary Metal Products Traditional 
35 Metal Products and Structures Modern 
36 Machinery Modern 
37 Electric Equipment Modern 
38 Transportation Means Modern 
39 Miscellaneous Manufactured Products Traditional 
Source : Greek National Statistics Service. 
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Appendix 2. Diagnostic tests on the econometric specification. 
 





N. of groups 
Hausman Degrees of Freedom Probability 
12 205 -9.60 5 1.000 
23 182 4.57 5 0.471 
25 219 9.61 5 0.087 
43 212 0.07 5 1.000 
42 221 0.45 5 0.994 
30 224 0.19 5 0.999 
41 220 0.35 5 0.997 
22 211 -1.08 5 1.000 
24 222 5.18 5 0.395 
13 129 0.70 5 0.983 
11 223 0.65 5 0.986 
14 223 0.98 5 0.964 
21 221 -18.01 5 1.000 
Refers to the probability of accepting the H0: IIA holds. 
 
 
Table 2. Collinearity Diagnostics  
 VIF Eigenvalue Condition Index R-square 
RMS 4.83 2.3665 1 0.7928 
HK 1.82 1.7897 1.1499 0.452 
LC 1.8 1.0509 1.5007 0.4432 
LI 2.36 0.4069 2.4116 0.5761 
KC 2.65 0.2639 2.9945 0.6224 
TF 2.92 0.1221 4.4032 0.6574 
     
Mean VIF : 2.73 Condition Index : 4.40  
 
 
Table 3. Correlation Matrix  
 RMS HK LC LI KC TF 
RMS 1.000      
HK 0.094 1.000     
LC -0.011 0.620 1.000    
LI 0.465 -0.169 -0.052 1.000   
KC 0.598 0.193 0.169 -0.141 1.000  
TF 0.743 -0.045 -0.058 0.618 0.237 1.000 
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Notes 
                                                 
1
 The NUTS classification has been used since 1988 in Community legislation and it distinguishes 3 levels. Form 
information on the NUTS classification, see http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/ramon/nuts/home_regions_en.html 
2
 However, these studies use a completely different methodology than the one incorporated here. 
3
 Guimaraes et al. account for the quality of work force by using the proportion of workers with a secondary education 
level. 
4
 Firms’ R&D expenditure may also serve as a measure for their competitiveness, hindering the entrance of new comers, 
who, besides the start up costs of a new plant would have to face competition from already established firms with more 
efficient production functions. 
5
 Louri, 1995, relates the provision of infrastructure to urbanization economies and incorporates urban population as a 
variable to capture this effect. 
6
 Anagnostaki and Louri, 1995, and Louri and Anagnostaki, 1995, use a concentration measure, given by the share of four 
largest firms of the sector in terms of employment.   
7 Nevertheless, as Paliginis (2001) mentions, Community and local transfers, important as they are, do not fully address 
peripherality, especially in a case like Greece where reallocation and restructuring of industries due to globalization and 
the creation of the Single European Market create negative dynamic effects.  
8
Total assets as a measure of firm size does not alter the results. 
9
 The use of net profits (instead of gross) provide a lower significance. 
10
 The classification of the sectors may be found in Appendix 1, Table 4. 
11
 Our data covers firms established back in 1860. 
12
The data corresponding to Figures 1-3 can be found in Appendix 1. 
13
 GR30 is the NUTS 2 classification according to European standards for Attiki, which basically consists of the capital, 
Athens. See, Tables 1 and 2 of Appendix 1 for regions’ classification in Greece. Also, see 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/ramon/nuts/codelist_en.cfm?list=nuts 
14
 We also experimented with an alternative specification, incorporating the R&D and excluding per capita private cars.  
Results are almost the same as in column 4. 
15
 This is contradictory to Louri (1988) who estimated a positive and significant influence of Greek regional investment 
incentives. Nevertheless, she used a computation of the present value of regional policy including up to four different 
investment incentives.   
16
 In the sub-samples examined henceforth, the Greek Development Law and the Community Structural Funds are not 
included for simplicity. However, even with their inclusion, results remain the same and as shown in the baseline model, 
only the European assistance seems to enhance the probability of choosing a particular location. These results are available 
upon request. 
17
 Checking for foreign new establishments is not feasible due to the small number of observations which amount to 12.  
18
 The only exception is associated to column 5΄ where LI gives a totally reversed than previously effect and the fact that 
herein TF, i.e. the existence of already established firms irrespective of their sector seems to increase the probability of 
choosing a particular region. 
19
 With respect to sub-samples discussed earlier (i.e. excluding Athens and Thessaloniki, traditional versus modern sectors 
and domestic firms) results comply with the ones without the firm-specific attributes, only that now both of these firm-
specific factors are both significant as shown in Table 6. These results are available upon request. 
 
 
 
 
